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Abstract—This position article addresses resilience in complex
engineering and engineered systems (CES). It offers a synthesis of
academic thinking with an empirical analysis of the challenge. This
article puts forward argumentations and a conceptual framework
in support of a new understanding of CES resilience as the product
of continuous learning in between disruptive events. CES are in
continuous evolution and with each generation they become more
complex as they adapt to their environment. While this evolution
takes place, new failure modes arise with the engineering of their re-
silience having to evolve in parallel to cope with them. Our position
supports the role of an overarching complexity science framework
to investigate the resilience of CES, including their temporal evolu-
tion, resilience features, the management and decision layers, and
the transparency of boundaries between interconnected systems.
The conclusion identifies the value of a complexity perspective
to address CES resilience. Extending the latest understanding of
resilience, we propose a circular framework where features of CES
are related to a resilience event and complexity science explains the
importance of interconnections with external systems, the increas-
ingly fast system evolution and the stratification of heterogeneous
layers.
Index Terms—Complex systems engineering (CES), complex
networks, complexity theory, resilience, system resilience.
I. INTRODUCTION
ENGINEERING systems are designed to specifications. Inaddition to functional requirements, a system’s reliability,
failure tolerance, or resilience form an integral part of the design
parameters. In principle, a system’s resilience should provide
Manuscript received May 8, 2019; revised August 21, 2019 and October
15, 2019; accepted November 24, 2019. This work was supported by the EP-
SRC ENCORE Network+ under Grant EP/N010019/1. (Corresponding author:
Giuliano Punzo.)
G. Punzo is with the Department of Automatic Control and Sys-
tems Engineering, University of Sheffield, S102TN, Sheffield U.K. (e-mail:
g.punzo@sheffield.ac.uk).
A. Tewari and E. Butans are with the Complex Systems Re-
search Centre, Cranfield University, MK430AL, Cranfield, U.K. (e-mail:
anurag.tewari@cranfield.ac.uk; eugene.butans@cranfield.ac.uk).
M. Vasile is with the Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineer-
ing, University of Strathclyde, G11XQ, Glasgow, U.K. (e-mail: massimil-
iano.vasile@strath.ac.uk).
A. Purvis is with the School of Engineering and Computing Sciences, Univer-
sity of Durham, DH13LE, Durham, U.K. (e-mail: alan.purvis@durham.ac.uk).
M. Mayfield is with the Department of Civil and Structural En-
gineering, University of Sheffield, S102TN, Sheffield, U.K. (e-mail:
martin.mayfield@sheffield.ac.uk).
L. Varga is with the Department of Civil, Environmental and Geomatic
Engineering, University College London, WC1E6BT, London, U.K. (e-mail:
l.varga@ucl.ac.uk).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/JSYST.2019.2958829
it with a capability to preserve its functionality over varying
conditions of stress or for uncertainties arising from natural or
human interventions [1].
For modern day engineering systems, designing for resilience
or testing resilience at the design phase, poses a significant
challenge. Due to the interconnectedness and embeddedness
of these systems in a nested system of systems [2]–[4], it gets
increasingly difficult to adopt the traditional approach of testing
a system in isolation for resilience. Here, isolation refers to
engaging with stress testing using a restrictive set of prede-
termined input parameters and system specific conditions [5].
The criticism of traditional, functional parameters and individ-
ual component-based failure testing approach is that it fails
to account for the continuous evolution and adaptation that a
system undergoes, in progressive generations, over its entire life
span. Modern era systems are highly complex and have deeply
coupled interdependencies that are difficult to account for in the
design phase. It is an undeniable fact that modern day systems are
more integrated, more interdependent, evolve at faster pace and,
in a word, are more complex than the systems of the previous
century [6], thus excluding the possibility of testing for resilience
in isolation. We shall refer to these new class of evolving “living”
systems as complex engineering systems (CES) and we further
argue that there is a need to look for alternative paradigms and
methodologies to approach these systems.
Supporting the argument for a need to develop alternative
methodologies to approach engineering system resilience, Ghe-
orghe and Katina [1] quote “the dwindling applicability of ‘old’
methods and tools cannot be expected to address increasing 21st
century concerns.” The underlying assumption to this assertion
is that being complex, these systems demonstrate complexity
traits such as adaptation, self-organization, and emergence; and
these system traits inherently conflict with the purpose-driven
approach of engineering system design that looks for con-
vergence of behaviors and consistency of design and perfor-
mance [7]. It is thus imperative for CES studies to resolve the
debates around complexity and its influence on resilience.
A complexity perspective prompts engineering systems’ re-
search to reason why a system behavior exceeds what is in-
tuitively the sum of its individual parts [8]. Prime examples
of these, that will be expanded later on, are transportation
infrastructure that not only connect existing places, but shape
the commuting patterns, the supply chains, the emergence of
new conurbation, and so on. Another question that may arise is
whether embeddedness or interconnectedness is actually to be
blamed for loss in resilience [9, p. 13]. Elsewhere in complex
natural system research, it has been established that in natural
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ecosystems, which are proven to be highly nested and intercon-
nected, there exists an inherent ability to survive and bounce
back [1]. If this is the case, then how do CES differ from other
similar man made or natural systems and what would be an apt
approach to study CES resilience. Motivated by these debates,
this article sets out to position the study of CES resilience in
the wider extant literature on complexity and resilience. After
establishing the positioning of CES in the interdisciplinary de-
bates of complexity and resilience, the article aims to provide
a synthesis of selected resilience examples from other related
domains of CES. More centrally, we propose a conceptual frame-
work that, acknowledging the circular nature of CES failures,
identifies in the learning element a way to avoid failure replicas
or escalations. To do so, we argue for complexity science to
be fully embraced as a framework within which CES are to
be designed and operated, widening the breadth of engineering
understanding. Looking at CES with a complexity perspective
will allow shifting the focus from the single components to their
reciprocal interactions within the engineered system they belong
and with its surrounding environment.
While the link between abstract science and engineering has
been highlighted before [7], [10], [11], there is considerable
scope for dialogue between the various fields of system
engineering seeking to exploit complexity methods beyond the
identification of failure mechanism, into the understanding of
the system’s dynamics. In this article, we argue in support of an
application of complexity science in the design of engineering
systems that, from commissioning to removal, coevolve with
their environment to turn away from their designed shape. Our
intentionally essential analysis of the literature is leveraged
to show how complexity disciplines, such as network science,
have so far either evolved in isolation or have found collocation
as a tool repository in support of the research carried out in other
domains, linking apparently distant fields, such as ecology and
engineering. It is not our intention to deliver a comprehensive
survey of the literature in this broad area. Using examples
we show that engineering-led approaches trail behind, not
considering real experience of system evolution. We hence
argue that a step change is achievable if complexity science is
used to guide the understanding of the system, with a system
engineering approach to manage the resilience of the system in
a time frame identified by the cyclical occurrence of disruptive
events, for which we propose a new, 1-D, periodic model.
The key argument that differentiates this article from others is
that we suggest resilience investigation to recognize the temporal
element of evolutionary adaptation in CES, presented at the core
of the article in the form of a resilience wheel, and incorporate
it in their process of continuous resilience evaluation.
Understanding the impact of emergence, interdependencies
and other characterizing CES features on resilience should not
be done in the system’s specific framework (in our case engi-
neering) but in a complexity science framework that can provide
a privileged position for applying the system specific tools.
II. ESSENTIAL AND QUANTIFIED ANALYSIS
OF THE LITERATURE
Resilience has its etymological roots in engineering [12], but
a bibliometric analysis of the literature suggests that ecology
is currently leading the investigation of resilience. Avoiding
Fig. 1. Citations per year of the 503 elements found in the engineering subset
(keywords resilien*, complex*, engineering). The last 25 years are considered.
Fig. 2. Cocitation map for keywords “resilien∗” and “complex∗.” Each pair
of linked node is a pair of scientific papers cocited in one of the 8538 records
returned by the research for the keywords.
duplication with literature reviews on the topic, in this section,
we produce a bibliometric analysis showing how complexity
enters the theme of resilience under different labels, with a
lack of a holistic view. Research on CES resilience is often
restricted to specific technical aspects, with complexity science
perspectives often overlooked.
A. Bibliometric Analysis
A literature search for the last 25 years (1993–2017) with
keywords resilien*, complex*1 identifies 8538 works (data
webofknowledge.com). By adding the keyword engineering, the
search identifies 503 works in the same period. The exponential
growth that the field underwent can be measured through the
number of works published and the citations they received (see
Fig. 1). In order to classify both sets of works by their research ar-
eas, we performed a cocitation analysis, similar to the one in [13]
for the field of industrial ecology. In a cocitation network, nodes
can be authors, subject fields, or scientific publications. Nodes
are linked if present or cited together in the same publication.
A description of the cocitation method can be found in [14].
The visualization of the results (see Figs. 2–4) is obtained using
Gephi [15]. We built two networks where nodes are scientific
1The * is a wild character to include all possible keywords starting with
resilien and complex, e.g., resiliency, resilient, complexity, etc.
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Fig. 3. Cocitation map for keywords “resilien∗,” “complex∗,” and “engineer-
ing.” Each pair of linked nodes is a pair of scientific papers cocited at least
five times the 503 records returned by the research for the keywords. The total
number of nodes in this map is 22. For each node, the size indicates its degree
while the colour indicates the subject group it belongs.
Fig. 4. Cocitation map for keywords “resilien∗,” “complex∗,” and “engineer-
ing.” SC field, edge weight ≥ 5. Complexity does not appear and works in
network science (present in the network of papers) is disguised under other
labels.
works cited in the 8538 and 503 publications, where colours
identify different subject fields while labels and authors were
assigned by inspection.
The first cocitation map of the works referenced by the
8538 publications covering the topics of “complexity” and
“resilience” is shown in Fig. 2. The field is dominated by
ecology, meaning that works in complexity and resilience refer
extensively to ecology research. Other important research areas
are network science and psychology. Resilience engineering is
a relatively small set in this collection.
Considering only the 503 publications of the engineering
subset, a second cocitation analysis was performed. For clarity of
representation, only publications cocited at least five times were
considered (see Fig. 3). A fundamental work by Holling [16] that
looks at ecological resilience is the center of this network and
the strongest connection to engineering is through the work by
Hollnagel [17], which sets the basis for the current understanding
of resilience engineering.
Works framing the problem of resilience very well in its
complexity, starting from engineering and moving beyond that,
are those by Dekker, Perrow, and Vaughan in [18]–[20], respec-
tively. These focus on catastrophic cascade failures and the role
that a system’s complexity plays in these. The fact that these
works are cocited less than five times, and hence, do not appear
in the network in Fig. 3, is possibly symptomatic of the field
often looking at specific system resilience issues, abstracting
them from the complexity attributes. In particular, already in
1984, Charles Perrow,2 framed very well the problem of ensuring
safe and reliable operations of systems that become hardly
predictable due to their complexity. This is in part captured by the
more recent work in [21] and some of the works in the resilience
engineering cluster [22]–[28].
Papers in network science, such as the works by Watts and
Strogatz [29], Barabasi and Albert [30], and Albert [31] are
among the most cocited (hence, influential) documents in the set
of publications. These works figure as highly influential despite
their starting point being fundamental network science, rather
than strictly engineering (examples considered come from bio-
logical and social networks, as well as the internet and the world
wide web), and despite not explicitly referring to resilience, but
rather looking at robustness instead. This, in turn, may suggest a
possible explanation to the growth in publications and citations
shown in Fig. 1 coinciding with the outbreak of network science
in the late ’90s. Moreover, it should be noted how resilience
and robustness, although conceptually different, are related and
often linked to other system’s properties such as recoverability
and reliability. The distinctions between these properties are not
uniquely marked, and often the choice of referring to one or the
other is field dependent [32].
We finally looked at the subject areas, as classified in the
webofknowledge database (SC field), and made the cooccur-
rence map in Fig. 4, again cutting the weight of the edges (the
number of times two fields are referred together to a single
publication) to five. In the map, there is no clear indication
of complexity-related disciplines, nor of network science that
emerged clearly at single-paper level. These disappear under
other labels used by the journals as interest fields, suggesting a
secondary overall level of attention. This suggests the absence
of a general framework of complexity science that is used as
literature classification and that is a reference for the resilience
of CES. Yet, through the scientific literature, the ideas of CES
and resilience do emerge, if not clearly, at least in a discernible
way. The next section will provide more details about these.
B. Link Between Complexity Science and Engineering
Engineering met complexity around the mid 20th century,
with Wayne Weaver framing the problems of organized com-
plexity as the new frontier for physics and Charles Perrow mak-
ing evident in 1984 how engineering problems are of organized
complexity nature [19], [33].
2The citation of Perrow’s work [19] refers to the 1999 edition of his work.
This was first published in 1984 through a different publisher
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Baranger, Gell-Mann, and Bar-Yam in [34]–[36], respec-
tively, are amongst those reinforcing the link and putting com-
plex systems in relation with chaotic systems and entropy. No-
ticeably, Bar-Yam identified complex systems as an approach,
as opposed to a family of systems, focussing on the relations and
interplay amongst the system’s parts and between the system as
a whole and its part [37], [38], being supported by others in his
conclusions [39], [40].
The approach prioritizing the interactions over the interact-
ing parts was formulated through complex networks as a way
of modeling complex systems, where the attribute “complex”
indicates structures which are not fully regular (i.e., lattices)
nor completely random. Starting from the seminal papers [29]
and [30], many of the world’s complex systems were modeled,
associated, characterized, and explained through complex net-
works. From these it was just a short step to move into resilience
themes, such as defining the propagation of a fault or the collapse
of a network following the removal of some nodes [41], [42].
In recognizing characteristics, such as emergence, nonlinear
interactions and, in many cases, continuous growth of the sys-
tems, engineers found themselves dealing with the problems
that [33] classified as organized complexity, entering the realm
of theoretical physics. Of the 43 metrics for complexity iden-
tified by Lloyd [43], measures used in engineering are mostly
model-based, that is, they refer to a model of the system to
capture features such as size, regularity, and interdependencies
[44]–[46].
C. Resilience and How It Applies to CES
In engineering, a popular understanding of resilience points
at the concept of bouncing back from disruptions, recovering
some level of performance the system had before being hit
by a shock [47], or exceeding the preshock performance after
recovering [48]. The United Nations International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction defines resilience more broadly as the sys-
tem’s ability to resist, absorb, accommodate, and recover from
the effects of a hazard [49]. This definition is also shared by
Linkov et al. [50] in their systemic approach to climate change,
centered on uncertainty quantification and risk management.
Adaptation to changing scenarios is a pronounced character-
istic of organizational resilience that applies to individuals and
communities facing adversities [51], [52].
With the breadth of engineering comprising a variety of
systems as well as a variety of approaches, resilience can be
captured generically as “enduring disruption.” Irrespectively
from how the definition applies to specific engineering domains,
a common characteristic appears to be the lack of quantifi-
able a priori metrics. If the system has not yet experienced
a performance loss, its resilience can hardly be quantified. In
particular, it is difficult to account for the through-life aspects
of resilience [53].
What makes CES resilience a complex matter on its own
is that it exceeds the system boundaries. In Charles Perrow’s
fundamental work [19], opposite to expectations, added devices
devoted to system safety, in fact, increase the level of complexity
and failure sources. “Normal accidents” are, hence, endoge-
nously generated within our society, and our engineering within
it, in a rush toward higher and higher levels of complexity. Con-
sider the example of a dam. The hydrogeological equilibrium of
the catchment, the proximity of inhabited areas and the climate
are some of the elements that make the dam something more
than a water retaining structure. It is in all respects a CES,
even in the case that the water retaining structure is the only
engineered part of it. In 2011, the Brisbane river catchment
was hit by persistent torrential rain for days before the January
catastrophic floods. The rain and the inflow from other reservoirs
filled the Wivenhoe dam, rapidly passing the levels between
which dam operators could exert some discretion in deciding
for water spillage. At the point that spilling was a necessity
to avoid structural damages, all the surrounding water ways
were already full and the spillage determined the catastrophic
flood [54]. Operational procedures were followed without flaws
by the dam operators, but the multiple, persistent shocks to
which the whole ecosystem was subjected showed the lack of
resilience in the associated CES [55]. Other relevant examples
within and beyond water engineering are the 1967 earthquakes
in Denver [56], the cases of the Kariba dam [57] and the Koyna
dam, in India [58].
The ever-changing scenario, including both the environment
surrounding the system and the system itself, is the fundamental
aspect that appears overlooked by the current approach. The
“Red Queen hypothesis” was first formulated in [59], again in
an ecological context, establishing the link between species’
resilience to extinction and their ability to quickly adapt to
changed conditions. The ability of species to adapt to new envi-
ronmental conditions faster than the rate of change of these could
explain the survival of species and complement Darwin’s natural
selection law by including elements of adaptation. This concept
translates to CES when considering the ability of systems to
adapt to ever-changing operations and operational scenarios.
The quicker CES achieve a new stable operating condition, the
more resilient it will be. System adaptability during distress
periods and before, while a system naturally evolves and new
technologies are bolted onto old substrates, is hardly captured
in traditional resilience engineering research.
D. Resilience for CES—The Example of Aerospace Systems
The design and operations of aerospace systems require high
levels of reliability (the ability to perform under specified con-
ditions and for a specified time) and robustness, because of the
difficulty in recovering from degraded states or failures. Space
systems have to operate without maintenance for several years
in harsh environments. Launch systems (both expendable and
reusable) need to achieve reliability over 90% for nonhuman-
rated flights and over 96% man-rated flights. Robustness and
reliability approaches in aerospace are described in [60]–[62].
An example of dealing with increased complexity due to
increased autonomy is the failure detection identification and
recovery (FDIR) system, which is able to detect (possibly pre-
dict) failure and can implement actions for system recovery.
Beyond reliability and robustness, resilience is addressed in
aerospace through the failure modes, effects, and criticality anal-
ysis (FMECA), an examination of the possible causes of faults
and consequences from its propagation across subsystems [63].
This attention to the robustness and reliability of the aerospace
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products does not always guarantee the resilience of the larger
system these products contribute to engineer.
Airplanes and spacecrafts are self-contained aerospace
products and complex engineered systems. An important layer
of complexity is added when these objects are coupled with
other systems, where not everything is known and there is not
necessarily a design envelope through which it is possible to
define normal operations. As an example, the failure, and suc-
cessive recovery of the Telsat Anik E-2 and Anik E-2 satellites,
in January 1994, caused an interruption of cable TV, telephone,
newswire, and data transfer services through Canada [64]. More
recently, the eruption of the volcano Eyjafjallajokull paralyzed
air traffic over the Atlantic and in most of Europe due to the
unknown risk associated with it [65].
E. Common Resilience Problem Across Engineering Domains
Across all engineering systems, resilience suffers from the
unpredictability of disruptions originating both outside the de-
sign domain but often within the wider system, considered as
the engineered part and the environment in which it operates.
The resilience of a system has and should be put in connection
with its complexity, as pointed out for example in [66], yet
when looking at the system complexity, one should look beyond
the system boundaries. The environment can be a source of
systemic threat, such as in aerospace systems with the presence
of particles in suspension in the atmosphere. This overlooking of
the wider system emerges from our bibliometric analysis, with
resilience and complexity often restricted within more specific
research fields. CES suffer from stratification and changing de-
mand patterns that accelerate obsolescence making single nodes,
designed in isolation, harmful to systemic resilience. The need
to achieve multiple objectives (safety, affordability, etc.) as well
as resilience is a defining characteristic. These considerations
call for reconsidering resilience as a continuous process aimed
at understanding the system in its complexity. This is the point
of our next section.
III. HOLISTIC APPROACH TO THE RESILIENCE OF CES
The literature offers numerous definitions for resilience and
it is not our intention to impose a new one to win them all.
However, it is our scope to explain our position about the
problem of designing and managing CES. To be able to proceed,
acknowledging the always increasing complexity of contempo-
rary engineering systems, we provide a definition for resilience
of CES.
Resilience of CES is the system ability to prepare by building
system awareness, identify premonitory signs by monitoring key
nodes and knowing their weaknesses, being robust at node level
(component or subsystem) to avoid collapse during speculated
adverse events, revise the system objectives by reconfiguring
and/or exploiting redundancy through the complex interplay of
its parts, and recover full service by reinstalling operations to
meet reviewed system objectives.
In light of this definition, resilience becomes a defining feature
of CES. It is a measure of how the different system parts
subsidize each other and work together in reinforcing each
other. Resilience intertwines with other characteristics such as
the distributed and heterogeneous nature of complex systems,
the need to gather meaningful information from a wide variety
of sources and adaptation in respect of the system goals. This
intersection between resilience and CES elicits the emergence
of natural research questions related to the applications of re-
search methods. How the rapid succession of multiple shocks is
responsible for cascade failure and sudden collapse is probably
the most evident of these. Also, how does the structure of the
CES influence its resilience? What design mechanism is needed
for CES systemic resilience? What are the resilience-critical
nodes and the edges to consider for different types of shock?
And so on. This list of questions is of course not exhaustive,
but provides an idea of the breadth of the field that opens up
at the intersection of resilience and CES. Even more than that,
the questions highlight the role played toward system resilience
by a thoughtful understanding of the complex structural and
dynamical interactions within and across systems.
A. All-Round Resilience Concept
The engineering systems’ literature recognizes the existence
of strong coupling among engineering system components,
natural surroundings, infrastructure availability, and interacting
social systems, and argues that these complex interdependencies
necessitate the study of engineering resilience from a complexity
perspective. A complex system perspective provides the neces-
sary theoretical foundation and analytical framework to study
the dynamic and emergent nature of system resilience. It is
often argued that system resilience can only be observed when
a system is exposed to unfavourable events, perturbations or
signals and inputs beyond normal operating or design condi-
tions. Thus, a longitudinal study of the system and events over
time provides the best opportunity to observe, measure, and
comment on the resilience performance of the system design.
Based upon this premise and on similar arguments from the
literature (e.g., [19], [67], [68], etc.), we converge to a simple
framework or concept of complex engineering system resilience.
This is one dimensional and temporal. The framework arises
from juxtaposing and consolidating existing literature, and has
validity from a deductive perspective. It presents the building
up of system resilience as a continuous learning process based
on the analysis of the system, its weaknesses and occurred
failures to prevent these from happening again. We shall call
such framework the resilience wheel.
The resilience wheel frames resilience around the changing
state of the system around a disruptive event, when passing from
the normal operations to a series of contingency and recovery
states. To each system state, the framework associates resilience
objectives that the system has to achieve, functions to absolve,
and event features to show resilient behavior. This way, the
resilience wheel merges the phases and pillars for resilience
introduced by Madni and Jackson [69] with the increasingly
popular understanding of resilience as continuous application
of risk management practices [70], which we argue to be the
way resilience should be understood for CES. As we can see,
the system sequentially passes through five distinct phases in
response to a threat. Each phase provides a separate viewpoint
to explore the phenomenon of resilience. The idea of a contin-
uous cycle of improvement was recognized by Hollnagel [71]
stating that a resilient system needs to know what happened
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Fig. 5. Resilience wheel is a 1-D temporal resilience framework.
and learn from it. The proposed concept follows this approach
by identifying learning that is achievable through a complexity
perspective.
Referring to Fig. 5, the five phases are termed as long before,
before, during, after, and long after. The phases are usually
different in length, with the during phase being the shortest,
and long before and long after phases being much longer than
the rest.
In order to characterize the system, we are going to describe
its resilience objectives and the way the system achieves them,
i.e., system functions. In addition, the event features for each
state are defined—predisposition, precursors, effects, impacts,
and outcomes corresponding to the system states normal, alert,
emergency, restoration, and recovery, respectively.
1) Long Before: The long before phase refers to the period
where there are no active or impending threats to the system
and the system is operating under normal design conditions.
However, despite being at a performance optima, a resilient
system will have processes constantly monitoring the system for
anomalies and threats and would also maintain system resources
and parameters to be sufficiently available in case of any even-
tuality or crisis situation. The system could be argued to have
a degree of self-awareness and standby preparedness achieved
through the observation of the system outputs and variable, only
possible through the knowledge of what are the outputs and
variables to observe.
2) Before: Engineering systems are designed for diagnosis
and prognosis of threats and vulnerabilities originating within
the components of the system. However, as CES are nested in
other systems with several complex interdependencies extend-
ing far beyond their direct control or influence, it is far more
important to monitor the vulnerability and threats originating in
the extended network of systems. Often there is a lag between
an event and its impact being felt on a connected system. The
resilience wheel refers to this time period, from the time of
detection of a vulnerability or threat to the time when this adverse
event actually impacts the performance of the system, as the
“before phase.” A more resilient system would be capable of
recognizing a threat earlier and would also be able to quantify
the severity of the impact. Early detection, informed by prior
system knowledge and training, can considerably reduce the
response time and help restrict the severity of impact.
3) During: In this phase, the system is directly subjected
to the negative effects of an unfolding threat and may lose its
normal state functionality in part or in full. Adaptation plays
a fundamental role in system resilience while disruptions are
unfolding. This may include changes to system structure and
operational procedures. An often overlooked aspect of adapta-
tion is a change in system goals. Considering that the goals of the
system have a significant impact on its functioning, they can be
one of the most effective ways to adapt to changing conditions.
The functional focus of a system in an emergency state is to
withstand the negative effects of adverse events by mitigating
them and preventing propagation of effects and cascading fail-
ures through the system and beyond the system’s boundary, a
process known as containment. While doing that, the system
needs to document the extent of damages as well as mitigation
and containment actions to the best of its ability to be used
later in the recovery and learning phase. To ensure an effective
response, the system makes use of resources that were planned
and allocated during the long before phase. Yet the system
benefits from the processing of outputs observable during the
distress phase. An understanding of what these outputs are is
achievable only if the system knowledge is developed to the point
of modeling the effect of a disruption ahead of this happening.
4) After: The after phase is concerned with recovery from
disruptions caused by adverse events and exiting the alert and
emergency states. As the recovery progresses, core goals are
being supplemented and replaced by an extended goal set per-
taining to normal functioning of the system. This extended set
may be the same as the original set of goals in the long before
phase, as the system “bounces back” to its original state [72],
or “forward” to an adapted state, resulting in delivery of a new
extended set of goals [73], [74]. To achieve the transition from
core to an extended set of goals, the system can reconfigure,
repair, or replace itself or one of its subsystems. After suffering
an adverse event, there may be multiple equilibrium points
requiring a coordinated recovery effort from interconnected
subsystems [75]. Uncoordinated restorative actions may cause
deadlocks in interconnected systems [76] and create cascading
failures. Only an overall, systemic consideration of the system
can deliver a coordinated action.
5) Long After: In the long after phase, the system operates
in conditions that will be regarded as normal. However, in
this phase, a resilient system would be simultaneously engaged
with the process of analyzing and learning from the events that
impacted the system. A complete analysis and assessment of
system impact could take a very long time.
In a continuing process of resilience improvement, results
from the analysis and deduced structural or process improve-
ments are continuously adopted by the system to make it more
resilient. While the system learns and adapts to past threats, this
long after phase slowly slips into the long before phase, and the
process continues in a cyclic manner.
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
PUNZO et al.: ENGINEERING RESILIENT COMPLEX SYSTEMS: THE NECESSARY SHIFT TOWARD COMPLEXITY SCIENCE 7
B. Examples of the Resilience Wheel in Action
The resilience wheel posits the need for evaluation of chang-
ing system conditions and requirements over an extended period
of time, which is often missed when an engineering system
is designed and tested for reliability using a functional design
approach and a range of scenarios. It is logical to argue that
these scenarios are not capable of providing an exhaustive set
of conditions, particularly the ones arising in nested systems of
systems (comprising of weather, infrastructure, social systems,
etc.). These system behaviors and conditions are path sensitive
and need to be evaluated on a real-time basis using a resilience
framework, such as the resilience wheel; failing to do so may
result in a disaster. There are numerous examples of disasters
that happened due to a lack of understanding of system resilience
and its dependence on other connected systems. A full validation
of the framework would require analyzing systems where this
is implemented and comparing them to systems where it is not.
Besides being difficult to achieve, this is outside the scope of
this work. We shall nevertheless provide two examples of CES
failures highlighting their links to the phases in the resilience
wheel. The first is about the Challenger and Columbia disasters
from the NASA space program—a program that, ironically, is
considered to have popularized the reliability testing methods
of engineering systems. The second is about the collapse of
the air traffic network following the eruption of the volcano
Eyjafjallajokull, previously encountered in Section II-D.
1) From Challenger to the Columbia: In the Challenger dis-
aster, the low-temperature issue leading to the sealing failure of
the “O-rings” [77] was known to the engineers but the consoli-
dated practice of launches at low outside temperature reinforced
the view that the risk was an acceptable one. Vaughan called the
practice “normalization of deviance” which refers to the attitude
of people becoming accustomed to behaviors, events, practices,
and processes that they normally would have considered wrong
or deviant from their own perspective [20]. Feynman described it
as “when playing Russian roulette, the fact that the first shot got
off safely is little comfort for the next” [78]. With the STS-107
Columbia disintegrating at re-entry, history repeated itself. The
foam detachment issue at the origin of the problem was a well
known risk, a recurring issue already noted in mission STS-7 and
STS-112. It was classified as an “accepted risk” for STS-113,
launched one month before the STS-107 Columbia [79]. The
parallel with the Challenger disaster is evident [80], with the
NASA blamed for negligence in official circumstances [79].
The Columbia incident lifted the curtain over a system far
more complex than the space shuttles and space transportation
system (STS) programme. Normalization of deviance did not
occur at the vehicle level. It was an organizational problem
showing a lack of resilience within the extended system, in which
the shuttle was just a “component.” The shuttle failure, at least in
the Columbia case, was a consequence of the lack of resilience
of the system (intended as organization) within which it was
operating.
The events between the Challenger and Columbia accidents
can be mapped to the resilience wheel 5, where we can consider
the system to be the NASA, whose objective is to enable manned
space flight within the STS programme. At the time of the Chal-
lenger event, in the during phase, the STS programme was halted
causing a disruption to the western access to space. The after
phase finished with the launch of STS-26-R Discovery on 29th
September 1988. The restoration included a new safety paradigm
and changes in the management at NASA, as it was clear how
misjudgment more than a technical failure were the reasons for
the explosion [20]. The recovery of the system in the long after
phase saw an in-depth understanding of the process dynamics
that determined the incident, but failed to remove some of the
causes that Vaughan indicates as reasons for the normalization
of the deviance. Among these, the hierarchical organization
that made safety-related decisions became a management and
not engineering concern. The after phase from the Challenger
event appeared concentrated more on the technical aspects than
on resolving the normalization of the deviance. This continued
during the following long before phase of the Columbia event,
with normal operations overlooking the foam shedding problem,
and eventually made ineffective the predictive power of the
alert in the before phase as threats such foam shedding were
overlooked.
2) North Atlantic Air Traffic Collapse in April 2010: On 14th
April, 2010, a mix of magma and meltwaters from the Eyjafjal-
lajökull glacier generated an explosive eruption sending fine-
grained ash the atmosphere. The jetstream quickly dispersed
these over Europe. On the basis of previous encounters between
airplanes and volcanic ashes, causing some jet engines to fail, the
air traffic across most Europe was grounded for several days and
intermittently in the following weeks [81]. It is estimated that, to
the aviation industry alone, this costed 250 million per day [82].
It can be argued that the air traffic control showed some resilience
by avoiding the risk of air disasters. However, this course of
action was driven more by the uncertainty about the effects
of volcanic ashes on jet engines, rather than the certainty that
such a concentration of that specific compound could be fatal.
Even accepting that the closure of the airspace was inevitable,
the lack of preparation, alternative routing, or technological
solutions to ensure a minimum continuity of service, were not in
place. Analyzing the events, it appears how in the before phase,
premonitory signs were advisable as the eruption culminated 18
years of intermittent volcanic activity [83]. The fact that imme-
diate short-term eruption precursors may be subtle and difficult
to detect highlights the gaps in science (in this case geophysics)
that we advocate should support engineering. The fact that the
during phase was dominated by uncertainty highlights the lack
of knowledge across fields and the research gap on the specific
effect on engineered systems [84]. Once achieved, this should
not rest within the engineering of turbomachinery, but reach out
to the air traffic regulations and operations. The same uncertainty
dominated the after phase, when air traffic was intermittently
restored. The long after and the long before phase lead up to
the present days, with analysis that saw network science used
in the attempt to explain why a pointwise threat became a
continentwide problem [65]. Several voices are now calling for
greater cooperation between scientists and aviation-sector ser-
vice providers to provide support to decision-makers [85]. With
the premonitory signs now being more clearly identifiable and
with the research that is currently undergoing, the opportunity
arises for better preparation to be made in the new before phase.
This appeal is an example, limited to the problems of the aviation
sector, of the general position expressed in this article. How this
appeal will be received and how quickly we realize that the same
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can be extended to all CES domains will shape the resilience of
our society through the systems on which it depends always
more.
IV. CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD
The rush toward integrated, intelligent, and synchronized
transportation, new energy sources, congestion-free urban en-
vironments, and their realization is associated, in many cases, to
a matter of “just” engineering. This so far successful approach is
revealing less capability to deliver resilient systems as the bound-
ary of systems are trespassed by increasing interconnectivity
where systems evolve in response to the evolving surrounding
environment. We acknowledge that all engineering systems
have some degree of complexity—from Roman aqueducts to
Babbage difference engine, but the complexity of such systems
was confined in time and space. Modern CES, those we are
concerned with, evolve over time, bolting new onto old tech-
nologies and in space, interacting and changing the environment
(natural, technological, social, urban, economic) in which they
operate. Our analysis of the literature confirmed that engineering
systems are perceived as complex but there is not a defined
and self-standing research stream looking at their resilience as
complex systems as opposed to specific, domain-bound systems.
The most popular engineering resilience definitions, even within
specific sectors, do not capture evolution and crossing bound-
aries, appearing often inadequate. In response to this, we argue
that the understanding of a system is a proxy for its resilience.
It is the key point in preventing, mitigating, adapting, and
improving after failures. This understanding, which translates
into learning around its failures, can only be captured using a
complexity perspective. There are multiple possibilities through
which this can be practically addressed. One can be summarized
as investing in research to progress complex system modeling
to integrate specific systems’ and environment’s features. The
new models, while incorporating real system features, should
keep the analytic tractability of abstract models, currently more
popular in science than engineering. In this way, the new models
can be useful to understand and predict complex system behavior
by uncovering and leveraging their fundamental dynamics.
As engineering systems evolve and do so at an increasing pace,
the design approach must evolve to incorporate the fundamentals
of complexity science. This will push designers to look beyond
strictly engineering to incorporate wider system aspects into
their job, enabled in this by the analytic tools that complexity
science can deliver. As Newtonian physics underpins our world
from the engineering of road bridges to the principles of flight,
so complexity science will underpin the understanding, at least
partially, of why cities are central for economic and cultural
prosperity, how the self-organization of the national grid allows
for handling, within some limits, a variety of load profiles, and
so on, up to deceptively simple phenomena such as the effects of
roundabouts on the traffic flow. Having such understanding will
allow learning across all phases of the resilience wheel before the
following shock hits the system. Achieving this passes through
research that bridges fundamental and abstract knowledge to
actual system dynamics. There is the need to conjugate hetero-
geneous systems and be able to model their joint dynamics in
a way that captures nonobvious interactions, including those
which arise as a later result of the whole system’s evolution.
At the same time, resilience engineering needs to evolve to
embrace complex features in understanding and designing of
systems changing over time or presenting new features following
a change in their environments. These ever-changing features of
complex systems are nowadays instrumental to the object of
resilience engineering.
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